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Illinois’ public sector
collective bargaining
statutes have been a success.

They have brought
collective bargaining to
thousands of the state’s
public employees.

They did not result in an
increase in strikes in
Illinois.

Interest arbitration has
produced a rich body of
arbitration awards, but it
tends to discourage
innovation.1
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issue:

Public Sector Collective Bargaining:
The Illinois Experience

Martin H. Malin
It is often said that states are laboratories for experimenting with different ways
to solve public problems. Nowhere is this more true than with respect to public
sector collective bargaining. State law governs the collective bargaining rights
of public employees, and the approaches range from such states as Texas and
Virginia where public sector collective bargaining is illegal to Illinois and
Minnesota which give government employees the most liberal right to strike in
the country. This article will review the evolution of Illinois’ approach to public
employee unionization and collective bargaining.

How did Illinois’ public sector bargaining law evolve?
Collective bargaining legislation came comparatively late to the public sector.
Although Congress enacted the Railway Labor Act governing railroads and later
airlines in 1926, and the National Labor Relations Act governing the rest of the private
sector in 1935, no state enacted a public sector collective bargaining statute until
Wisconsin did so in 1959. Illinois’ statutes were not enacted until 1983. They took
effect in 1984.
The absence of a statute, however, did not prevent public employees from joining
unions. The Chicago Teachers Federation, the forerunner of the Chicago Teachers
Union, was organized in 1898; it affiliated with the Chicago Federation of Labor in
1902 and with the American Federation of Labor in 1914. By 1917, more than half of
the 7,000 teachers in the Chicago Public Schools reportedly were members of the
union. Also in that year, the Illinois Supreme Court held it lawful for the Chicago
Board of Education to prohibit membership in the union on pain of discharge.
Courts at that time distinguished between an individual’s First Amendment right of
free association and the individual’s government job, which the courts considered to
be a privilege. In a series of decisions in the 1960s, the United States Supreme Court
overruled this right/privilege distinction, and lower courts soon afterward held that
public employees have a First Amendment right to join labor unions.
Union membership does not equate to union representation, however. In the absence
of a statute, an employer would recognize and bargain with a union only if it chose to
do so. An employer could rescind prior recognition regardless of how long the prior
relationship had lasted and could discriminate between groups of employees,
recognizing a union for one group while refusing to recognize a union for other
groups.
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Nevertheless, a good deal of collective
bargaining occurred in Illinois before
1984. Although strikes were illegal,
they still occurred with considerable
frequency. The United States Bureau of
Labor Statistics reported that the Illinois
public sector averaged 40 strikes per
year between 1974 and 1980, with a
high of 53 strikes in 1979. The Illinois
State Board of Education tracked strikes
by elementary and secondary teachers
by school year. Its data is presented in
Table 1.

table one
Pre-IELRA K-12 Teacher Strikes
Year
1975-76
1976-77
1977-78
1978-79
1979-80
1980-81
1981-82
1982-83
1983-84

No. of Strikes
26
25
16
26
40
36
21
16
15

How did the Illinois statutes come
to be enacted?
Numerous collective bargaining bills
were introduced in the legislature
during the 1970s, but none were enacted
until 1981. A 1981 amendment to the
School Code gave public school
employees a right to certify a union
approved by a majority vote of the
employees, but that statute neither
required collective bargaining nor
provided enforcement mechanisms.
In 1983, the legislature passed the
Illinois Public Labor Relations Act
(IPLRA) to cover all public employers
in the state, including public education.

At virtually the same time, the
legislature passed the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act (IELRA)
which covered only public education.
Governor James Thompson, using his
amendatory veto, deleted the coverage
of public education from the IPLRA and
then signed both bills. The IELRA
justifies having a separate statute for
education because “substantial differences exist between educational employees and other public employees as a
result of the uniqueness of the educational work calendar and educational
work duties and the traditional and
historical patterns of collective bargaining . . .”
The Illinois Labor Relations Board
(ILRB) administers the IPLRA. It is
divided into a Local Panel, which has
jurisdiction over Chicago, Cook County,
and some special districts in the Chicago
area except for the Regional Transportation Agency, and a State Panel, which
has jurisdiction over all other state and
local employers. The governor, mayor
of Chicago and chair of the Cook
County Board each appoint one member
of the Local Panel. The governor
appoints all members of the State Panel.
The governor also appoints all members
of the Illinois Educational Labor
Relations Board (IELRB), which administers the IELRA.

What rights do the statutes provide?
Both statutes provide that employees
have the right to form and join unions
and to engage in concerted activity for
mutual aid and protection. The statutes
also provide that individual employees
have the right to refrain from engaging
in such activities.
The statutes protect employee rights by
prohibiting unfair labor practices by

employers. Employers may not, for
example, interfere with the employees’
efforts to exercise their rights under the
act, discriminate against an employee
for participating in union activities,
spend public funds to influence the
outcome of a representation election, or
refuse to bargain in good faith.
Similarly, the laws prohibit unfair labor
practices by the unions or their
members. Such practices include, for
example, restraint or coercion of
individual employees seeking to exercise their statutory rights, such as their
right not to join a union; undue efforts to
influence an employers’ choice of
representatives for handling collective
bargaining or grievances; or refusing to
bargain in good faith.

How do employees create a union?
The statutes provide two methods. An
employer may voluntarily recognize an
employee union, in which case it must
post a notice of its intent. If, after the
required time for posting, no rival union
has filed a proper petition objecting to
the proposed union, the employer and
the proposed union may submit evidence that the union has the support of a
majority of the employees to the labor
board which may certify the union as
exclusive representative.
In the absence of voluntary recognition,
a union may petition the labor board to
designate it as the employees’ exclusive
representative for collective bargaining.
The petition must show that at least 30
percent of the employees desire the
union’s representation. The board then
conducts an election, in which rival
unions may intervene. If a union
receives a majority of the votes cast, the
board certifies it as exclusive representative.
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Can union representation be
curtailed?
A group of employees may file a
petition with the labor board showing
that at least 30 percent of the employees
no longer desire to be represented by an
incumbent union. The labor board then
conducts an election and, if the
incumbent union does not receive a
majority of the votes, the board
decertifies it (i.e. the union will no
longer be recognized as the exclusive
bargaining representative until it wins
another election proving majority support of the employees represented).

About what are the parties
required to bargain?
The acts require the parties to bargain
about wages, hours, and terms and
conditions of employment. Often matters related to public employees’
working conditions also involve significant issues of public policy.
The Illinois Supreme Court has adopted
a three step test to determine whether
such an issue must be bargained. First,
the labor board considers whether the
matter involves wages, hours, or
conditions of employment. Second, the
board considers whether the decision
involves a matter of inherent managerial
authority. Third, if the first two
questions are answered affirmatively,
the board balances the benefits that
bargaining will have on the decision
making process with the burdens that
bargaining imposes on the employer’s
authority. Applying this approach,
courts and labor boards have held, for
example, that school districts must
bargain over class size, but that the
Illinois Department of Corrections need
not bargain its decision to drug test
correctional officers.

A very difficult issue is whether an
employer may or must bargain proposals to arbitrate, discipline, and discharge
as an alternative to, or substitute for,
proceedings before a civil service
commission. On this issue, the courts
have held that different rules apply to
home rule and non-home rule municipalities.
In contrast, the Illinois Supreme Court
has held that a school district may not
agree to arbitrate matters that might be
part of the School Code’s procedures for
the dismissal of tenured teachers. Any
such matter may only be litigated before
a State Board of Education hearing
officer in the School Code-provided
dismissal hearing.

What about the right to strike?
Illinois has one of the most liberal rights
to strike in the country. Most states
prohibit strikes by public employees. Of
the states that allow strikes, many
require prior resort to non-binding fact
finding and rejection of the fact finder’s
recommendation. Illinois has five conditions for a lawful strike:
1. The employees are represented by
an exclusive representative.
2. Any existing collective bargaining
agreement has expired
3. The union has given at least five
days notice of intent to strike.
4. There have been unsuccessful
efforts to settle the dispute through
mediation.
5. There is no agreement to arbitrate
the dispute.
A number of states that allow strikes
also provide that strikes may be
enjoined if they pose a clear and present
danger to the public health, safety or
welfare. Illinois law expressly rejects
allowing an injunction for strikes that
endanger the public welfare, but it does

permit an injunction if the strike poses a
clear and present danger to public health
and safety.
This has clear implications for teacher
strikes: they can not be stopped by court
action. The only strikes in Illinois that
have been found to endanger the public
health and safety have been at water
treatment facilities and municipal electric
utilities. In these instances, the union
must to provide a skeleton crew to keep
the service operating and the parties
must arbitrate their dispute.

May police and firefighters strike?
Sworn law enforcement personnel,
correctional officers, firefighters, and
fire department paramedics do not have
the right to strike. If their unions reach
impasse with their employers, they have
a right to arbitrate the disputed issues.
While they have a right to use an
arbitration panel, most parties have
waived this right in favor of a single,
neutral arbitrator.
Each party submits a final offer on each
issue in dispute to the arbitrator. For
non-economic issues, the arbitrator may
select either final offer or a solution in
between. For each economic issue,
however, the arbitrator must select one
of the final offers.
Within twenty days following issuance
of the arbitration award, the employer’s
governing body may reject all or part of
the award by a three-fifths vote. In the
event of rejection, the parties return to
the arbitrator for supplemental
proceedings. The employer must pay the
full cost of the supplemental proceedings,
including the union’s attorney fees.
Thus far, governing body rejections
have been rare and futile. In the few
cases that have occurred, arbitrators
have not allowed the employers to
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modify their final offers without the
union’s consent.

What has been the primary effect of
the statutes?
By far, the primary effect of the statutes
has been to bring collective bargaining
to thousands of public employees who
did not have it before. Although there
have been a handful of decertification
elections, the overwhelming majority of
the labor boards’ representation work
involves certification of representatives
in previously unrepresented bargaining
units.
This effect of the act was immediate. In
the first three years of the IELRA, 192
new bargaining units were certified in
the state; the number of school districts
engaged in collective bargaining with
teachers increased by 53 per cent in the
act’s first year alone. The same effect
occurred for non-education workers: in
the first 30 months of the IPLRA, the
number of recognized bargaining units
increased by 418. As shown in Table 2,
which reports recognition elections held
and bargaining units recognized, the
number of recognized bargaining units
has continued to increase steadily.
Table 2 presents some other interesting
patterns. Most recognitions occur
through elections rather than voluntary
recognitions, and unions win the
overwhelming majority of representation
elections. In many of those units,
employees could not have obtained
representation without the statute. In
some, the unions may have exerted
enough political and economic pressure
to cause the employers to recognize
them. The statute relieves employers of
that pressure by enabling them to defer
to the labor boards’ election machinery.
Unlike the private sector, most public
employers do not mount overt and

aggressive anti-union campaigns.
However, by deferring to labor board
secret ballot elections, they enable
questions concerning representation to
be resolved by the most accurate
available indicator of employee
sentiment.

What has been the experience with
strikes under the acts?
Intuitively, one would expect that
legalization would lead to an increase in
strikes. That has not been the case.
Outside of public education, strikes
have been extremely rare; outside of
education, Illinois averages less than
one public employee union strike per
year.
The impact of legalization can be
gleaned from the strike experience in
the early years following enactment of
the IELRA. Using data obtained from
the IELRA, Table 3 summarizes this
experience.
In comparing Table 3 (post IELRA
strike activity) with Table 1 (pre IELRA
strike activity) one must realize that the
post IELRA data also reflect a
substantial increase in the number of

tabletwo

tablethree
Strikes in Public Education
Year

No. of Strikes

1984-85
1985-86
1986-87
1987-88
1988-89
1989-90
1990-91
1991-92

35
13
16
6
6
11
14
25

units engaged in bargaining. Thus, it is
readily apparent that legalization did not
result in an increase in strike frequency.
Analyzing this data, a study published in
the University of Michigan Journal of
Law Reform in 1993 found a correlation
between legalization and a decrease in
the number of strikes. The study
controlled for inflation (which is
believed to correlate with increased
strike activity) and unemployment rates
(believed to correlate with decreased
strike activity). Depending on the test
used, legalization was able to explain up
to 25 percent of the decrease in the
number of strikes. The study concluded

State Board/Panel Representation Activity

Fiscal Year

Election
Unions Won

Election
Unions Lost

No. of
Employees

Voluntary
Recognition

No. of
Employees

1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001

73
69
61
84
66
74
81
86
79
66
82
80
77
61

5
11
9
8
11
6
15
17
9
11
6
14
12
11

1,872
2,231
1,267
2,697
1,318
2,025
2,968
1,512
1,467
1,897
2,024
2,188
2,326
2,487

11
19
10
10
15
7
5
10
10
9
7
10
8
7

NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
57
77
175
169
64
73
128
162
71

Source: Illinois Labor Relations Board
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that legalization clearly did not increase
strike frequency and suggested that it
might have contributed to a decrease.
Illinois public sector strikes tend to be
relatively short-lived. Most settle in two
weeks or less. It is very rare for a strike to
last longer than a month. The worst strike
in the history of the IELRA began on
October 17, 1986, in Homer School
District 208 in rural Champaign County
and lasted until after the end of the school
year. Everyone lost, especially the 360
students who lost many days of school
and endured a constant turnover in
substitute teachers when classes were
held. The school district went out of
existence, merging with another district.
Just one of the seven school board
members continued to serve and only a
few of the 30 striking teachers kept their
jobs.
The Homer strike was propelled by such
incredible animosity on both sides that it
probably would have occurred even if
strikes had not been legal. A court might
have enjoined the strike, but the union
probably would have defied the injunction
even at the expense of seeing its leaders
jailed. The animosity was so strong that
an offer by Governor Thompson of
substantially more state aid if the parties
would settle could not induce a
settlement. The law was essentially
irrelevant in Homer as animosity and
irrationality ruled the roost.
Fortunately, Homer stands out as an
extreme aberration and a warning to
parties of what can happen if the process
gets out of control. Even today, parties
can be heard to say that they do not want
to be the next “Homer.”

What has been Illinois’ experience
with interest arbitration?
There are two general criticisms of
interest arbitration — the use of
arbitration when collective bargaining
fails to secure agreement between the
parties. First, it chills bargaining
because parties hold back expecting the
arbitrator to award something between
their positions and their opponents’
positions. Second, it becomes addictive
as parties return to the arbitrator
multiple times instead of agreeing to
terms.
In Illinois, on economic issues,
arbitrators may not split the difference;
they must pick one party’s final offer.
But an arbitrator may pick the union’s
final offer on one issue and the
employer’s final offer on another. There
is some anecdotal evidence that parties
keep issues on the table that they don’t
value highly because they believe they
have to give the arbitrator something to
award to the other side. To the extent
this happens, it inhibits reaching
agreement.
While some parties in Illinois appear to have
succumbed to arbitration’s narcotic effect,
the arbitration addiction does not appear to
have become endemic in the state.
The primary effect of interest arbitration
is its impact on bargaining. A rich body

of interest arbitration awards has
evolved in this state. It is clear from
those awards that arbitrators strongly
prefer the status quo. A party seeking to
add a new term or modify an existing
term has a very heavy burden to
convince the arbitrator to adopt its offer.
This makes agreement to innovate more
difficult to obtain in bargaining.
On economic issues, arbitrators place
the most emphasis on the outcomes in
comparable communities. This is
because the arbitrator’s role is to issue
an award that resembles the agreement
the parties would likely have reached if
their negotiations had not broken down.
The best evidence of what wage and
benefit settlements the parties might
have accepted are the settlements
reached by comparable parties.
Consequently, interest arbitration tends
to flatten out bargaining and induces
parties to follow established patterns at
the expense of local peculiarities.
To the extent that the effects of
arbitration on bargaining are viewed
negatively, they represent the price paid
for avoiding strikes. The critical benefit
of interest arbitration is that the parties
involved in it virtually never strike.
There isn’t much sentiment in Illinois or
elsewhere for allowing police, deputy
sheriffs, corrections officers, and
firefighters to strike.

conclusion:

So, what’s the bottom line?

All-in-all, the Illinois public sector collective bargaining statutes have been a
success. Under the statutes, public sector labor relations have matured and
stabilized. For every antagonistic relationship, many more positive, cooperative
relationships have evolved. Anecdotal evidence suggests that more is gained by
both parties through bargaining than through strikes. Thus, more of the credit for
the success of Illinois’ public sector collective bargaining laws is due to the
maturity and sophistication of the bargaining parties than to the law itself.
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